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Abstract
1 A multiple-input single-output (MISO) wiretap channel model is considered, that includes a multi-
antenna transmitter, a single-antenna legitimate receiver and a single-antenna eavesdropper. For the
scenario in which spherical uncertainty for both the legitimate and the eavesdropper channels is included,
the problem of finding the optimal input covariance that maximizes the worst-case secrecy rate subject
to a power constraint, is considered, and an explicit expression for the maximum worst-case secrecy rate
is provided.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless physical (PHY) layer based security approaches exploit the physical characteristics of the
wireless channel to enhance the security of communication systems. The most basic physical layer model
that captures the problem of communication security was proposed in [1]. Later, the Gaussian scalar
wiretap channel was studied in [2]. Recently, the secrecy capacity of multi-antanna wiretap channels has
been studied in [3], [4]. The above work assumes that perfect channel state information (CSI) on the
legitimate and the eavesdropper channels. When ellipsoidal channel uncertainty is included, the worst-
case secrecy rate of multiple-input single-output (MISO) cognitive radio network was studied in [5]. In
[5], the worst-case secrecy rate maximization problem is converted to a quasi-convex problem by using
the S-procedure to express the channel uncertainty constraint in a linear matrix inequality (LMI) form.
In [6], a MISO channel in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers, each equipped multiple antennas, was
considered. Perfect CSI as well as channel uncertainty were considered in [6]. As in [5], the problem
was converted to a semidefinite programming (SDP) problem by using the S-procedure to express the
channel uncertainty constraint in LMI form.
In this paper, we consider the same MISO wiretap scenario as in [5], [6], except that we consider a
special case of the channel uncertainty considered in [5], [6], i.e., spherical uncertainly. For this case, we
derive an explicit expression of optimal input covariance that maximizes worst-case secrecy rate subject
to a power constraint. In particular, the solution is obtained via finding the eigenvalues of a known 6-by-6
matrix. The advantage of such an explicit solution lies in:
1) Independent of the number of antennas the problem leads to a 6-by-6 matrix whose entries are
obtained by direct and simple calculation from the estimated channel values (see Eq. (8) and (28)).
The computation time for finding the eigenvalues of such 6-by-6 matrix is not affected by the size
of problem. In contrast, for the existing methods ([5], [6]), the computation time for the iteration
algorithm is affected significantly by the size of problem.
2) The structure of the optimal input covariance matrix is explicitly given (see Eq. (12)).
3) A (simple) necessary and sufficient condition for a positive worst-case secrecy rate is explicitly given
(see Theorem 1).
Notation- Upper case and lower case bold symbols denote matrices and vectors, respectively. Super-
scripts ∗, T and † denote respectively conjugate, transposition and conjugate transposition. A  0 means
that the matrix A is Hermitian positive semi-definite. |a| denotes the absolute value of a, while ‖a‖
denotes Euclidean norm of the vector a. eig(A) denotes the eigenvalues of the matrix A.
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2II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a Gaussian MISO wiretap channel, which includes a transmitter is equipped with nT antennas,
and a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper, each equipped with a single antenna. The received signals
at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are respectively given by
yR = h
†
Rx+ vR, and yE = h
†
Ex+ vE (1)
where x is the nT × 1 transmitted signal vector with zero mean and covariance matrix Q = E{xx†};
hR, hE are respectively channel vectors between the transmitter and legitimate receiver, and between the
transmitter and eavesdropper; vR, vE are the noises at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper with
zero means and unit variances, respectively.
We consider the scenario in which spherical channel uncertainty, i.e., [7, §18.2.4]
hR ∈ ΩR = {hR
∣∣ ‖hR − h¯R‖ ≤ ǫR}, (2)
hE ∈ ΩE = {hE
∣∣ ‖hE − h¯E‖ ≤ ǫE} (3)
where h¯R and h¯E are the estimated values, ǫR and ǫE are the estimated error bounds. Let P be the
transmitted power budget. We investigate the maximum worst-case secrecy rate defined as [5]
Rs = max
Q0,Tr(Q)≤P
min
hR∈ΩR,hE∈ΩE
Rs(Q,hR,hE) (4)
where Rs(Q,hR,hE) = log(1+h†RQhR)−log(1+h†EQhE). We aim to find the optimal input covariance
matrix Q⋆. A necessary condition to ensure Rs > 0 is 0 /∈ ΩR, i.e.,
‖h¯R‖ > ǫR. (5)
We assume that the condition (5) holds in this paper.
Since log(·) is an increasing function, (4) is equivalent to
max
Q0,Tr(Q)≤P
min
hR∈ΩR,hE∈ΩE
1 + h†RQhR
1 + h†EQhE
. (6)
Let τ⋆ be its optimal objective value. Certainly, τ⋆ > 1 is equivalent to Rs > 0.
III. EXPLICIT SOLUTION OF OPTIMAL INPUT COVARIANCE MATRIX
One can show that if τ⋆ > 1 (Rs > 0), then there exists a rank one matrix, to be denoted by Q⋆. The
proof can be found in [6]. With this, we assume τ⋆ > 1 and find the rank one Q⋆. If such rank one Q⋆
achieves Rs > 0, Q⋆ is indeed the solution of the problem. Otherwise, Rs = 0.
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3Since τ⋆ > 1, it is easy to verify that Tr(Q⋆) = P . Then, we let Q = Puu† and rewrite (6) as
max
‖u‖2=1
1 + P min
hR∈ΩR
|u†hR|2
1 + P max
hE∈ΩE
|u†hE |2 . (7)
Let us denote
a = P‖h¯E‖2, b = P‖h¯R‖2, c = ǫR‖h¯R‖
, d =
ǫE
‖h¯E‖
,
r =
|h¯†Eh¯R|
‖h¯R‖ ‖h¯E‖
, and z0 = max(c,
√
1− r2 ). (8)
Let z⋆ be the solution of
max
z0≤z≤1
[
g(z) =
1 + b(z − c)2
1 + a
(
rz −√1− r2√1− z2 + d)2
]
. (9)
The main result of this paper is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1:
i) The sufficient and necessary condition for Rs > 0 is that

√
1− r2 z0 +
(
r −
√
b/a
)√
1− z20 ≥ 0√
1−r2
√
1−z20 −
(
r−
√
b/a
)
z0 > c
√
b/a+ d
(10)
or


√
1− r2 z0 +
(
r −
√
b/a
)√
1− z20 < 0√
1− r2 + (
√
b/a− r)2 > c
√
b/a+ d
. (11)
ii) Assume that (10) or (11) holds. In other words, τ⋆ > 1. The solution of (7) is
u⋆=
√
1− z⋆2
1− r2
h¯E
‖h¯E‖
−
(√1− z⋆2
1− r2 +
z⋆
r
) (h¯†Rh¯E)h¯R
‖h¯R‖2‖h¯E‖
. (12)
It can be seen from (12) that u⋆ is a linear combination of h¯R and h¯E . The maximum worst-case
secrecy rate is
Rs = log
1 + b(z⋆ − c)2
1 + a
(
rz⋆ −√1− r2
√
1− z⋆2 + d)2 . (13)
Remarks: Let us gain some insight into the conditions for Rs > 0. Obviously, (10) and (11) are both
independent of P . In other words, if neither of these two conditions holds, Rs > 0 cannot be achieved even
when infinite power is used. Roughly speaking, this may occur if the estimation is not good enough (c, d
is relatively large), or the legitimate channel is worse than the eavesdropper channel, i.e., ‖h¯R‖ < ‖h¯E‖.
Proof of Theorem 1
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4For the optimal u, consider the two subproblems in (7):
min
hR∈ΩR
|u†hR|2, (14)
and max
hE∈ΩE
|u†hE |2. (15)
Their optimal objective values can be obtained in closed form, given by (|u†h¯R|−ǫR)2 and (|u†h¯E|+ǫE)2
respectively. Moreover, since τ⋆ > 1, it holds that |u†h¯R| > ǫR. More details can be found in Appendix
A. From this result, (7) is equivalent to
max
‖u‖2=1, |u†h¯R|>ǫR
1 + P (|u†h¯R| − ǫR)2
1 + P (|u†h¯E |+ ǫE)2
. (16)
We can reduce (16) to a problem of one variable. To this end, let z = |u†h¯R|/‖h¯R‖. The domain of z is
ǫR
‖h¯R‖
< z ≤ 1, (17)
which follows from Cauchy’s inequality and the constraint |u†h¯R| > ǫR. It can be seen that the condition
(5) ensures a non-empty domain of z. Obviously, for fixed z (i.e., |u†h¯R| is fixed at ‖h¯R‖z), |u†h¯E |
should be minimized. Keeping this in mind, let
ψ(z) ,min
u
|u†h¯E | (18)
s.t. ‖u‖2 = 1, and |u†h¯R| = ‖h¯R‖z.
Then, we rewrite (16) as
max
z
1 + P (‖h¯R‖z − ǫR)2
1 + P (ψ(z) + ǫE)2
s.t.
ǫR
‖h¯R‖
< z ≤ 1. (19)
The function ψ(z) is obtained in closed form using the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Let a and b be (known) unit-norm vectors with r = |b†a| < 1, and 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. The
problem
min
u
u†bb†u (20)
s.t. u†aa†u = q, and ‖u‖2 = 1
has an optimal objective value
 (r
√
q −√1− r2√1− q )2 if q ≥ 1− r2
0 if q ≤ 1− r2
. (21)
Moreover, if q ≥ 1− r2, then the optimal u is given by
u⋆ = −
(√
1− q
1− r2 +
√
q
r
)
(a†b)a+
√
1− q
1− r2 b. (22)
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5The proof is given in Appendix B. The proof is similar to the one of Lemma 2 in [8].
We assume that h¯R and h¯E are linearly independent (otherwise, the problem is reduced and simpler).
Let a = h¯R/‖h¯R‖, b = h¯E/‖h¯E‖, r = |h¯†Eh¯R|/(‖h¯R‖ ‖h¯E‖), q = z2. It follows from Lemma 1 that
ψ(z) =
{ ‖h¯E‖(rz −√1− r2√1− z2 ) z ≥ √1− r2
0 otherwise
. (23)
Note that in (19), (|h¯R|z − ǫR)2 is an increasing function of z. On the other hand, ψ(z′) = 0 for any
z′ <
√
1− r2 . Thus, it holds that z⋆ ≥ √1− r2 (otherwise, there exists z⋆ < z′ < √1− r2 such that z′
achieves a larger objective value. But this contradicts the optimality of z⋆). With this, we rewrite (19) as
(9). Here we replace the constraint z > c by z ≥ c for convenience. Furthermore, from (22), we obtain
(12).
From the objective in (9), the sufficient and necessary condition for Rs > 0 is that there exists a
z0 ≤ z ≤ 1 such that
√
b (z − c) > √a (rz −√1− r2√1− z2 + d), or equivalently
max
z0≤z≤1
[
g1(z) =
√
1− r2
√
1− z2 − (r −√b/a )z]
> c
√
b/a+ d. (24)
Consider the optimization problem in the left hand side of (24). The derivative g′1(z) = −z
√
1− r2/√1− z2−(
r −
√
b/a
)
is a strictly decreasing function of z. On the other hand, g′1(z) → −∞ as z → 1. Thus, if
g′1(z0) ≤ 0, then z0 is the solution; if g′1(z0) > 0, then the optimal z is the unique point with z0 < z < 1
and g′1(z) = 0. From this fact, we obtain (10) or (11). This completes the proof.
A. Determining z⋆
Note that the derivative g′(z) → −∞ as z → 1. Thus z⋆ is either z0 or one of the feasible points (if
any) with g′(z) = 0. We introduce the bijective transform
z =
2x
1 + x2
, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 (25)
to rewrite (9) as
max
x
[
F (x) =
p0x
4 + p1x
3 + p2x
2 + p1x+ p0
q0x4 + q1x3 + q2x2 + q3x+ q4
]
(26)
s.t.
1−
√
1− z20
z0
≤ x ≤ 1
where p0 = 1+ bc2, p1 = −4bc, p2 = 4b+2bc2+2, q0 = 1+ a(
√
1− r2+ d)2, q1 = 4ar(
√
1− r2+ d),
q2 = 2 − 2a + 6ar2 + 2ad2, q3 = 4ar(−
√
1− r2 + d), q4 = 1 + a(−
√
1− r2 + d)2. The solution x⋆
November 7, 2018 DRAFT
6should be (1 −
√
1− z20 )/z0 or one of the feasible points (if any) with F ′(x) = 0. One can rewrite
F ′(x) = 0 as an equation of six degree
a0x
6 + a1x
5 + a2x
4 + a3x
3 + a4x
2 + a5x+ a6 = 0 (27)
where a0 = p1q0− p0q1, a1 = 2p2q0 − 2p0q2, a2 = 3p1q0 + p2q1 − p1q2 − 3p0q3, a3 = 4p0q0+ 2p1q1 −
2p1q3 − 4q4p0, a4 = 3p0q1 + p1q2 − p2q3 − 3q4p1, a5 = 2p0q2 − 2q4p2, a6 = p0q3 − q4p1. All the six
roots of the equation (27) equal the eigenvalues λi of the following 6× 6 matrix [10, Ch. 6]
G =

 −a1a0 −a2a0 −a3a0 −a4a0 −a5a0 −a6a0
I5 05×1

 . (28)
Thus, the optimal x satisfies (if there exists several feasible candidates for x⋆, the best one is chosen)
x⋆ ∈
{1−√1− z20
z0
, eig(G)
}
. (29)
Once x⋆ is obtained, we have
z⋆ =
2x⋆
1 + x⋆2
. (30)
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section we provide some examples to illustrate the result. We focus on how to obtain the explicit
solution. For more numerical simulations on different estimated channel values, e.g., (ǫR, ǫE) please refer
to [5] and [6].
First consider a MISO wiretap channel with nT = 4 antennas. We set (ǫR, ǫE) = (10−2, 10−2),
P = 5dB and
h¯R=


−1.0301+ 0.3060i
−0.0162+ 0.5618i
0.7134− 0.1504i
1.0488 + 0.1086i

, h¯E=


−0.3475− 0.0816i
0.3662− 0.1442i
0.2450− 0.4282i
0.2369 + 0.2346i

.
According to (8), we obtain that a = 2.01390, b = 9.84720, c = 0.0566687, d = 0.0125309, r =
0.540848, z0 = 0.841120. Then, according to Theorem 1 i), we calculate
√
1− r2 z0+
(
r−
√
b/a
)√
1− z20 =
−0.1959 < 0,
√
1− r2 + (
√
b/a− r)2−(c
√
b/a+d) = 1.8452 > 0. Thus, (11) holds and hence Rs > 0.
Then, we have
eig(G)=
[
47.92,−1.46, 0.0016 ± 0.99i, 0.6741,−0.016].
There is only one feasible x = 0.6741 among eig(G). Then, we obtain x⋆ = 0.6741 and hence z⋆ =
0.9270.
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7Finally, according to (12) and (13), we have u⋆ = [0.4692 − 0.3024i, 0.1854 − 0.4521i, −0.3258 −
0.1020i, −0.5655 + 0.1153i]T and
Rs = 3.1162 (bits/s/Hz).
Fig. 1 plots the secrecy rate for different power P .
Second, we give an example in which Rs > 0 cannot be achieved. We set (ǫR, ǫE) = (0.05, 0.05),
and h¯R = [0.1216+0.0118i, 0.0106−0.0316i,−0.0856−0.1063i, 0.2241−0.0216i], h¯E = [0.3599+
0.0174i, 0.1655−0.1923i,−0.2323−0.4065i, 0.7313−0.2272i]. Neither of (10) and (11) holds. Thus,
Rs > 0 cannot be achieved even when infinite power is used.
V. CONCLUSION
We study the problem of finding the optimal input covariance that maximizes the worst-case secrecy
rate of a MISO wiretap channel under channel uncertainty, subject to a power constraint. We show that
the optimal input covariance can be obtained via finding the eigenvalues of a known 6-by-6 matrix.
APPENDIX A
CLOSED FORM SOLUTIONS OF (14) AND (15)
First, we solve (15). Let hE = h¯E + ǫEy. The constraint hE ∈ ΩE becomes ‖y‖ ≤ 1. Thus, (15) is
equivalent to
max
‖y‖≤1
|u†h¯E + ǫEu†y|2. (31)
First, |u†h¯E|+ ǫE is an upper bound of |u†h¯E + ǫEu†y| which can be easily verified from the triangle
inequality and Cauchy’s inequality. Moreover, this upper bound can be achieved: y = (u†h¯E/|u†h¯E|)u
(if u†h¯E = 0, then y = u). Thus, the optimal objective value of (31) is (|u†h¯E |+ ǫE)2.
Second, we solve (14). Let hR = h¯R + ǫRx. The constraint hR ∈ ΩR becomes ‖x‖ ≤ 1. Thus, (14)
is equivalent to
min
‖x‖≤1
|u†h¯R + ǫRu†x|2. (32)
Since τ⋆ > 1, it holds that the optimal objective value of (32) is greater than zero. Note that the
objective value of (32) is zero at the point x1 = −(u†h¯R/ǫR)u. Thus, x1 must be infeasible and hence
|u†h¯R| > ǫR. With this, we can show that |u†h¯R|−ǫR is a lower bound of |u†h¯R+ǫRu†x| which can be
easily verified from the reverse triangle inequality and Cauchy’s inequality. Moreover, this lower bound
can be achieved: x = −(u†h¯R/|u†h¯R|)u. Thus, the optimal objective value of (32) is (|u†h¯R| − ǫR)2.
This completes the proof.
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8APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
First, we show that the optimal objective value is zero if and only if q ≤ 1− r2. Denote the null space
of b as Eb with E†bEb = I and EbE
†
b = I − bb†. Then b†u = 0 if and only if there exists a vector z
such that u = Ebz which, when inserted into u†aa†u = q and ‖u‖2 = 1, results in that ‖z‖2 = 1 and
z†E
†
baa
†Ebz = q. Note that 0 ≤ z†E†baa†Ebz ≤ λmax(E†baa†Eb) = a†EbE†ba = a†(I−bb†)a = 1− r2.
In other words, ‖z‖2 = 1 and z†E†baa†Ebz = q hold if and only if q ≤ 1−r2. The desired result follows.
Second, we consider the case q > 1 − r2. The optimal u is a linear combination of a and b, which
follows from its optimality condition bb†u−µ1aa†u−µ2u = 0 or equivalently µ2u = (b†u)b−(µ1a†u)a
where µ1 and µ2 are multipliers (Obviously, µ2 6= 0 since r < 1). From this result, we let u = c1a+c2b.
Since eiωu (for any real ω) satisfies the constraints and attains the same objective value as u, we can
restrict c2 ≥ 0. Inserting u = c1a+ c2b into the constraints and objective, results in
|c1|2 + c22 + c∗1c2a†b+ c1c2b†a = 1, (33)
|c1|2 + c22r2 + c∗1c2a†b+ c1c2b†a = q, (34)
and u†bb†u = 1− |c1|2(1− r2). (35)
From (35), we need to maximize |c1|2. From (33) and (34), we get c22(1 − r2) = 1 − q which leads to
c2 =
√
(1− q)/(1− r2) . By denoting c1 = |c1|eiθ where θ is the argument of c1, we can rewrite (33)
as
|c1|2 + |c1|c2r(e−i(φ+θ) + ei(φ+θ)) + (c22 − 1) = 0 (36)
where φ is the argument of b†a. This is a quadratic equation of one variable |c1|. It is not difficult to show
that the optimal θ = π−φ, and the optimal |c1| = c2r+√q. Thus, the optimal c1 = (c2r+√q )ei(π−φ),
and hence
u = −
(√
1− q
1− r2 +
√
q
r
)
(a†b)a+
√
1− q
1− r2 b. (37)
Here we have used the fact that, ei(π−φ) = −e−iφ = −a†b/r. Further, from (35), we obtain
u†bb†u = 1− (c2r +√q)2(1− r2)
= (r
√
q −
√
1− r2
√
1− q )2. (38)
This completes the proof.
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Fig. 1. Worst-case secrecy rate versus power, P , of a MISO wiretap channel with 4 transmit antennas. (ǫR, ǫE) = (10−2, 10−2).
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